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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
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District Court Judge: Faith S. Hochberg
Argued on June 2, 2003
Before: ALITO, ROTH and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: July 9, 2003)
ANDREW M. MOSKOWITZ
(argued)
76 South Orange Ave., Suite 205
South Orange, NJ 07079
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2OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM:
Clarence P. Roberts (“Roberts”) appeals an order of the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey (“District Court”) dismissing his complaint against
the Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Brent (“Brent”) with prejudice for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment
of the District Court.
Because we write only for the parties, we need not discuss the factual background
of this case.  Roberts makes three contentions on appeal.  First, Roberts argues that the
District Court was not authorized to dismiss his complaint before he could serve Brent
with process.  Second, Roberts maintains that even if the District Court could dismiss the
complaint prior to service of process, the District Court was required to allow Roberts
leave to amend his complaint.  Finally, Roberts avers that the District Court erred by
determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Roberts’s suit.  We address
Roberts’s contentions in turn below.  Because the present case involves only disputes of
law, our review is plenary.  In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1989).
I.
Roberts claims that a District Court cannot dismiss a complaint on its own motion
before the plaintiff serves process on the defendant.  In support of this proposition,
3Roberts cites Urbano v. Calissi, 353 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1965), and Mayberry v. Prasse, 449
F.2d 1266 (3d Cir. 1971).  In Urbano, the District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’
complaint prior to service of process on the defendants.  We vacated the District Court’s
judgment and remanded for further proceedings.  In a brief opinion, we stated that since it
“appear[ed] that none of the defendants ha[d] been served with the complaint,” it was
“desirable that the action be permitted to proceed in the customary manner.”  Urbano, 353
F.2d at 197.  In Mayberry, the District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ action pre-service
“without any consideration of the merits.”  Mayberry, 449 F.2d at 1266.  We vacated and
remanded, stating simply that “the district court should have followed here the advice
given in the Urbano case.”  Id. at 1267.
We agree with Roberts that Urbano established the supervisory rule that a District
Court may not dismiss a suit prior to service of process.  This rule rests on three sound
prudential grounds.  First, the dismissal of a complaint prior to service of process can
compromise the District Court’s appearance of impartiality.  See Oatess v. Sobolevitch,
914 F.2d 428, 431 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing this consideration in favor of the proposition that
a District Court may not dismiss a complaint prior to service of process under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).  Second, “[w]hile [a] district court may aim” by dismissing a complaint
prior to service of process “to clear its docket of what appears to be a meritless case and
relieve the defendants of the time and expense needed to respond, if an appeal is taken the
case shuttles between the district and appellate courts.”  Id.  Finally, in such
1Our recognition of the possibility of harmless error in this context aligns our
jurisprudence in this area with that of several other circuits that have concluded that
dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate even where
such dismissal occurs prior to service of process.  See Joyce v. Joyce, 975 F.2d 379,
386-87 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction prior to service of process); Zernial v. United States, 714 F.2d 431, 433-34
(5th Cir. 1983) (affirming a dismissal prior to service of process on the ground that “[s]ua
4
circumstances “the appellate court . . . will likely be without the aid of opposing counsel
to clarify the issues.”  Id. 
We do not, however, read Urbano to foreclose the possibility that dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction prior to service of process may be harmless error.  Such
a reading would be inconsistent with the grounds on which Urbano was decided.  To
support our conclusion in Urbano, we cited a Ninth Circuit decision, Harmon v. Superior
Court, 307 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1962), in which that court reversed a District Court decision
dismissing a complaint prior to service of process.  Importantly, Harmon was not decided
on the ground that dismissal before service of process is always improper.  Instead,
Harmon emphasized that a “District Court always has power to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction . . . . at any time that such lack appears.”  Harmon, 307 F.2d at 797.  It was
the Harmon court’s determination that the District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1343, not a blanket rule prohibiting dismissal prior to service of process for lack
of jurisdiction, that formed the basis for its conclusion.  Id. at 797-98.  We would not
likely have relied on Harmon in Urbano if we held the view that dismissal prior to service
of process always constitutes reversible error.1  Moreover, preserving the possibility of
sponte dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is, of course, proper at any stage of
the proceedings”); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981) (“In contrast
to dismissals for failure to state a claim, if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it is
not required to issue a summons or follow the other procedural requirements.”) (citing
Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 58 (9th Cir. 1967)).
5
harmless error in these circumstances comports with Fed. R. Civ. P. 61, which recognizes
that “any ruling or order” by a District Court may constitute harmless error.  See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 61 (“No error in . . . any ruling or order . . . by the court . . . is ground for . . .
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice.”).  Accordingly, we hold that while it constitutes
error for a District Court to dismiss an action prior to service of process on the defendant,
that error may be harmless under certain circumstances.
Although we need not enumerate all of the possible circumstances under which the
dismissal of a complaint prior to service of process may amount to harmless error, we
believe that one such situation obtains where it is apparent, on the face of the complaint,
that the District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.  This determination comports with
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), which categorically states that “[w]henever it appears by
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject
matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also Ruhrgas AG
v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be
policed by the courts on their own initiative even at the highest level.”).  As we explain
below, we believe that the District Court in the instant case erred by dismissing Roberts’s
6complaint prior to service of process on Brent, but that such error was harmless because it
was clear from the face of Roberts’s complaint that the District Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction.
For a District Court to possess subject matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s action
under Article III of the Constitution, the plaintiff must have standing to sue.  ACLU-NJ v.
Twp. of Wall, 246 F.3d 258, 261 (3d Cir. 2001).  A “plaintiff only has Article III standing
if,” inter alia, “‘it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.’”  Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 361 (3d Cir.
2000) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181
(2000)).  When the question whether a plaintiff’s “‘claims of economic injury would be
redressed by a favorable decision . . . depends on the unfettered choices made by
independent actors not before the court[] and whose exercise of broad and legitimate
discretion the court[] cannot presume either to control or to predict,’” US Ecology, Inc. v.
United States DOI, 231 F.3d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish,
490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989)), the plaintiff must “adduce facts showing that those choices
have been or will be made in such manner as to . . . permit redressability of injury,” Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992).
In the instant case, Roberts’s alleged injury consists of the taking of his property
by Brent pursuant to the judgment of the Chancery Division of the British High Court
(“Chancery Division”).  Roberts argues that if the District Court issued a declaratory
7judgment stating that he had not been served in compliance with the Hague Convention
on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial
Matters (the “Convention”), that declaration “would likely cause the court in the English
action to vacate its order.”  Brief for Appellant at 13.  The redressability of Roberts’s
injury therefore depends on the future actions of the Chancery Division, an “independent
actor not before the court.”  Roberts was thus required to plead facts suggesting that the
Chancery Division would vacate its order if the District Court issued a declaratory
judgment in Roberts’s favor.
Roberts’s complaint, however, contains no indication of why the Chancery
Division would vacate its judgment if the District Court issued the declaratory judgment
Roberts seeks.  Accordingly, Roberts’s complaint failed to allege that his injury was
redressable by a favorable decision.  The District Court therefore correctly determined
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Roberts’s action.
Since it was apparent from the face of Roberts’s complaint that the District Court
did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Roberts’s suit, we hold that, although the
District Court erred by dismissing Roberts’s complaint prior to service of process, the
District Court’s error was harmless.
II.
Roberts next contends that the District Court erred by failing to afford him leave to
amend his complaint.  In support of this proposition, Roberts cites Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a),
8which states that “[a] party may amend the party’s pleading once as a matter of course at
any time before a responsive pleading is served.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).  Since no
responsive pleading had yet been served on Roberts at the time the District Court
dismissed his suit, Roberts argues, Roberts should have been allowed to amend his
complaint.
It is well established that even before a responsive pleading has been filed, a
District Court may dismiss a plaintiff’s claim without leave to amend where “any
amendment would be futile.”  Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000); see also
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (“When a plaintiff
does not seek leave to amend a deficient complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss it,
the court must inform the plaintiff that he has leave to amend within a set period of time,
unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.”); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well
Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986) (“If a complaint is dismissed for
failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be granted unless the court determines that
the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly
cure the deficiency.”).
We have held that where the absence of subject matter jurisdiction is apparent
from the face of a complaint, any amendment would be futile, and hence dismissal
without leave to amend is proper.  See Miklavic v. USAir, 21 F.3d 551, 557-58 (3d Cir.
1994) (“[W]e find that granting leave to amend would have been futile on [the] ground . .
2At oral argument, Roberts acknowledged that he is not currently suffering injury
as a result of threats by Brent to execute the Chancery Division’s judgment in the United
States.
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. . [of] lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”).  As noted above, it was clear from Roberts’s
complaint that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his suit.2 
Accordingly, the District Court was not required to grant Roberts leave to amend.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

